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SYSTEMS MOVEMENT
Autobiographical retrospectives
Systems movement: autobiographical retrospectives is a special section of this Journal, the 
purpose of which is to produce, via invited autobiographical articles, historical information 
and insights regarding the thought processes and individual motivations of leading figures 
in the systems movement. This valuable information is normally not included in regular 
publications, which tend to focus on results rather than the creative process leading to those 
results. The autobiographical articles are likely to help us improve our understanding of how, 
and why, the systems movement has progressed since its emergence in the mid-twentieth 
century. Each article in this section is published strictly by invitation extended to individual 
authors by the Editor, and is based on the recognition that these individuals have made 
major contributions to the systems movement.
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Reporting on anticipatory systems: a subject surviving 
opportunism and intolerance
Mihai Nadin
Institute for research in anticipatory Systems, university of texas at Dallas, richardson, tX, uSa
George Klir – in memoriam
Context
Almost 7 years ago, George Klir invited me to put my activity in some retrospective. I 
learned from him that in 1992 a reluctant Robert Rosen reminisced on his formative years. 
His acquiescence to the “duty to report” resulted in a document that is humbling to all of 
us. Rosen’s impressive oeuvre did not emerge in a vacuum. The way we live and what we 
do are intertwined. Academia is a tough environment: Bertalanffy’s heart attack (“killed 
by the system”, as we learn from Rosen) and the demolition of the Center for Theoretical 
Biology in Buffalo (1967) testify to a narrative usually sanitized. In reality, science does not 
graciously advance to better understandings of its subjects or to acknowledging those very 
few who made such understandings possible. George Klir was also one of them.
Beginnings
My report harks back to a Romania of a time that does not want to be forgotten. When 
the moment came to decide, I was probably less clear about where I wanted to study (not 
much choice) than what I wanted to study. In February 2016, as my book The Civilization 
of Illiteracy was released in a Romanian translation (20 years after its original publication), 
I was again with the man from whom, in 1955, I asked for advice. Solomon Marcus, the 
eminent mathematician, founder of mathematical poetics, as well as mathematical lin-
guistics, was then at the beginning of what became an illustrious career of encyclopedic 
propensity. What went through his mind when a high school graduate from the provinces 
(for those living in Bucharest, Braşov, my hometown, as well as every other place beyond 
the capital city, was “provincie”, or countryside) asked him where he should go to study the 
subject of creativity, he never told me. “It was a crazy idea, like so many of Nadin’s original 
views”, were his words in describing the beginning of my activity to the packed auditorium 
of the School of Mathematics and Information Science at the University of Bucharest. (Two 
weeks after his presentation of my book, he passed away. At the age of 91, he was tirelessly 
designing a forward-looking course of education for Romania’s youth.)
Somehow I ended up applying at the Polytechnic (Institutul Politehnic), competing for 
one of the very few spots available in the first class allowed to study what would eventually 
become computer science. Only one year before, the communist party declared cybernetics 
to be “representative of Anglo-American Imperialism”.
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The Polytechnic was the place where distinguished scientists found their academic home, 
sometimes in a kind of exile. Nicolae Ciorănescu, a Sorbonne-educated mathematician, 
was allowed to teach here after having spent time in jail – for political reasons. It was not 
unusual for other professors to come to his classes. Ciorănescu was witty but extremely 
exigent. Ion Agârbiceanu, also politically tainted, taught physics. My first research project 
took place in his lab (and concerned lasers; our professor was an expert in spectroscopy). 
Among our superb professors were Radu Voinea (who eventually became president of the 
Romanian Academy), Tudor Tănăsescu (expert in electronic circuits), Edmond Nicolau 
(cybernetics, and almost everything else), Gheorghe Cartianu, Alexandru Spătaru, and 
Mihai Drăgănescu (also a future Academy president) (Figure 1).
From Lyapunov to control theory and Aristotle’s prolepsis
I was riding the tram on my way from the Polytechnic to the student dormitories when 
Marcian Guttman asked me, with his typical heavy stuttering, to solve a Lyapunov equation 
scribbled on his ticket (one inch long, less than half-inch wide). As Ciorănescu’s assistant, 
Guttman was notorious for stalking students with math problems. You could not avoid or 
evade his questions. One theorem led to another, and so on, from differential equations to 
matrix calculus. After quite a few such sessions with a “travelling tutor” I did not ask for, 
at exam time I knew more mathematics than my friends studying it at the University of 
Bucharest – considered the better place for those wishing to become “pure” mathematicians.
The Polytechnic gave me the structured basic scientific and technological education in 
the absence of which my research would probably have evolved in a different manner. My 
thesis was on Control Theory. (It seemed, at that time, that being exposed to Lyapunov’s 
Figure 1. 1959: research with Professor alexandru Spătaru (left) and 2 of my colleagues: marius Guran 
(right, leaning), who was later in charge of the renaC/renoD (romanian network connected to the 
Internet), and Gheorghe Samachişe (2nd from left), prolific inventor who, at SanDisk in San Jose, brought 
his contribution to flash card technology.
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equation on my tram ride with Marcian Guttman was fortuitous.) Control Theory opened 
to me what would eventually become the subject of my entire activity: anticipation. In this 
respect, consider this less than innocent statement from Aristotle:
If every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others, 
like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, “of their own 
accord entered the assembly of the Gods;” if, in like manner, the shuttle would weave and 
the plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not want 
servants, nor masters slaves.
(The poet Aristotle made reference to was none other than Homer.) Anticipating the will of 
others, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum would touch the lyre without a hand to 
guide them – these were thoughts that could get a future engineer quite excited. But before 
pursuing such a challenge, I had to design and build a system, and I needed to describe it:
and express it mathematically:
Actually my notes contain an interesting third expression:
The domain of x(t + 1), i.e. the future, contingent or well defined, was to progressively 
become my focus. I look back and smile. A linear control system, or even nonlinear control-
lers, seems now so simple. But at the time of the degree project it was not. The vector X space 
to which x belongs can be easily defined: let’s say, the control system applies to controlling 
the speed of a bike. Things are less clear when it comes to control parameters: biking uphill, 
biking downhill, biking over obstacles, etc. They belong to a set of admissible parameters. 
The feedback mechanism (to “control” the control process) was less straightforward. System 
stability considerations made implementation even more challenging. To compensate for 
amplitude error caused by the delay time, I would use a saw-tooth generator.
Memories are always tainted by experiences accumulated over time. What the student of 
those days was thinking and what the graduate learned afterwards are different things. The 
student had to design, among other things, a function generator for the control process. A 
(1)State of system = function (control parameter)
(2)x = f (c)
(3)x(t + 1) = f (x(t))
Figure 2. Saw-tooth generator (1960).
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saw-tooth wave generator for the linear control was an engineering task. Here is the original 
sketch of the circuit conceived and built, using – Alas! for those reading my text in the age 
of integrated circuits – a vacuum tube, a pentode, of course (Figure 2).
What this sketch does not reveal is that “anticipating the will of others” suggests processes 
that remind us that what is alive develops over time, reproduces, and eventually ceases to 
have life. For the future engineer, real-time control meant to deal with mapping from the 
vector space of the system’s states (x) to admissible controls (c). This constrained reality. 
Nature, however, always leaves room for fluctuations. The serious mathematics taught at the 
Polytechnic allowed the student I was at that time to understand that analytical geometry, 
calculus, vector analysis, and trigonometry were indispensable for describing how machines 
work. Engineering depends upon physics and mathematics. It took me another 25 years 
before I started questioning their usefulness, in the form I studied them, for describing life. 
I knew that the hand guiding the plectrum was not as precise as mathematics for engineers 
was in describing machines. Actually, in the realm of life nothing is precise.
Defense of the thesis was not unproblematic. The machine worked. But I was also sup-
posed to justify it within the official philosophy of communism, the so-called “dialectic 
materialism”. In this respect my project was found deficient. Combined with this were ideo-
logical shortcomings, and “stains” on my biography – one had to be of “Romanian” descent, 
with no “bourgeois” forebears, no relatives abroad, etc. You get from this the explanation 
why I was not offered a position at the Polytechnic to the surprise of everyone in my class, 
and many of my professors (those who survived the purge after the events of 1968).
It was for the better. (The “What if …?” speculation is of no interest here.) The Polytechnic 
gave me the awareness that creativity was not really hidden in the saw-tooth generator, but 
rather in Aristotle’s anticipation, prolepsis as his concept was. It took luck to get the approval 
from the Minister of Education (a distinguished mathematician, Mircea Maliţa, eventually 
turned politician and diplomat) to pursue a second degree while I was working as an engi-
neer. (The details are pretty interesting, but not for what I am trying to report on.) During 
this time, my contact with Solomon Marcus (in the meanwhile associate professor at the 
University) became more frequent. I went to some of his classes, and through him I met 
Grigore Moisil, the mercurial iconoclastic figure of Romanian mathematics. The experience 
in Control Systems, a domain of knowledge transcending engineering, gave me opportu-
nities to argue in favor of a distinction that not even today is unanimously accepted. The 
machine can be fully controlled. The living, even in its simplest forms, changes continuously. 
It controls itself. In its dynamics, which means goal-driven behavior, it acquires its unique 
identity, its functionality. The dynamics of the machine is the expression of its design: it is 
supposed to accomplish desired goals. In contrast, the dynamics of the living is the result 
of interactions. Machines do not change. Their physical embodiment is subject to wear and 
tear. The living is identified through change, from inception to death. The machine and 
the living are different in their dynamics. The subject of change entered my life for good.
Aesthetic creativity
Pursuing the second degree meant bringing scientific and technological questions into a 
new gnoseological territory, not simply adopting the traditional questions of speculative 
aesthetics. The systems view of aesthetic activity was unheard of before that. Moreover, in 
the years after the Polytechnic experience and during the time of pursuing a second degree 
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in aesthetics, computation picked up and gained in acceptance. Therefore, it became even 
possible to formulate questions in computational terms.
If we are seeking knowledge, we’d better look for it in everything human beings do: 
science and art, thinking and feeling, reflected and unreflected activities, learned and auto-
nomic forms of expression. At the Polytechnic, aesthetic considerations played a secondary 
role (mainly in the design component of engineering). In the aesthetics context, Aristotle’s 
understanding of what it would take to have a world where our hands would do less (or 
nothing) was not an issue. Of even less significance was the computer, although in some 
form or another artists, in particular composers, never shied away from “calculating” and 
“performing” some of their compositions.
My understanding of computation was based on what I had studied at the Institute. 
Romania, with a respectable scientific tradition, was indeed ahead of other communist coun-
tries in building its first computer (the CIFA 1, 1955, mentioned in Mathematical Review, 
June 1958), under the direction of Victor Toma (a Polytechnic alumnus) and Armand 
Segal, at the Institute for Nuclear Physics. But their computer was not accessible to anyone 
outside the Institute. My intention was to describe the particular knowledge (defined later 
as aesthetic knowledge) that undergirds the acts of drawing, of painting, of turning sounds 
into melodies, of telling stories. Could images made from instructions given to a machine – 
regardless which machine – eventually be accepted as paintings, sculptures, music? Was it 
all knowledge, or was something else at work as well?
My initial, rather simplistic, understanding of what a computer is came about years 
before I’d even heard about the “dangerous machines” that would turn us all into slaves 
of capitalism (the propaganda of those years). I was still in high school when I first saw 
a weaving machine, a peasant’s rudimentary loom. A peasant woman’s hand was at work. 
Her good taste was not informed by any concept of art; she was not schooled in design 
(probably illiterate, as many poor people were in Romania before and after World War II). 
Her skills were picked up from her mother, or somebody in the family. No books read and 
no museum visits. She was creating with the same naturalness as in giving birth – itself a 
form of creation (Figure 3).
The artisanal artifact (no redundancy here: artisanal means made in a traditional or 
non-mechanized way, while artifact highlights workmanship of cultural or historic interest) 
Figure 3. the “computer” before the computer.
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allowed the weaver to select, combine, and integrate rows and columns of colored threads. 
Did Aristotle really mean that this creation could be performed without a hand guiding 
the process? It was at that time that one of my questions started crystalizing: Can we make 
machines that are creative? That is, machines that translate aesthetic anticipations into 
works of art? To be creative is to give birth to something that never existed before. With 
this premise came a bit of metaphorical description. Every birth is the outcome of inspired 
love, insemination, many struggles, pain – all in anticipation of, not in reaction to, the 
world in which the creation will find its place. Weaving can be art – reflecting the weaver’s 
talent – or manufacture, a machine-based productive ability, different from that of aesthetic 
creation. Joseph Marie Jacquard’s punched cards, Herman Holerith’s mechanized census 
tabulation, and Howard Aiken’s calculating device have a lot in common with the loom. 
Charles Babbage’s Differential Engine even more (Lady Lovelace Objection not withstand-
ing). However, they are implementations of algorithmic computing, as James Essinger has 
shown (Jacquard’s Web: How a hand-loom led to the birth of the information age. Oxford 
University Press, New York 2004). As automated machines, they negate the interactive 
nature of creative processing on the loom.
Back to my involvement with computers and the question of anticipation. Finally, I had 
a chance to see the computer: stacks of cards, a rudimentary monitor, dials, thousands of 
vacuum tubes (cooled by fans). I had imagined it to be no less exciting than a loom. It was 
not. The outcome of computation was also disappointing. On those rare occasions when 
my ability to adapt to the stringencies of machine language programming (and to the 
hexadecimal system) made sense, all I got were strings of numbers, something requiring 
further deciphering.
Time reference: May–August 1966. What does it take to draw a line point by point 
(“raster” was not yet in my vocabulary) (Figure 4).
An improvised printer made it possible to see what I thought should be the outcome. 
In an article in Leonardo (“Science and Beauty”, 1991), I gave some examples of my early 
work. Recently (July 2016), this work was again featured in Leonardo in the Pioneers and 
Pathbreakers series, documenting the beginnings of computer art. The crummy paper on 
which the drawings were plotted, by now yellowed and probably soon to disintegrate, testifies 
to a time when nobody thought of acid-free paper, not to mention archival quality printing. 
The lines are bluish, the “printer” often dripped. I concocted a cheap fountain pen ink, with 
Figure 4. my “algorithm” for line drawing; discrete points making up a line on paper (“dripping effect”).
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a lot of sediment that blocked the syringe needle – a kind of a pen. The thickness of the lines 
varied, but not because I was able to make them of various weights (I wish I could have).
What you cannot see in these images is my confusion: Is this all? Drawing by hand was 
faster and more accurate. The loom was so much more exciting: it produced the canvas and 
the art integrated in it. Or was it the artist who operated it, the hand that Aristotle was so 
eager to eliminate? Indeed, Rembrandt’s brush in my hands, or Picasso’s various “tools”, will 
not make me, or anyone else, the artist they were. And what about “anticipating the will of 
others”, which seemingly Homer in his Iliad (to which Aristotle alluded) associated with the 
life of authentic art? Could a machine create Homer’s poetry? (It can of course be imitated.)
The study of aesthetics was paralleled by my experimental attempts. Art, as I discovered, 
is made by artists. I was not one. The benefit of being exposed to creative processes gave me 
access to a more informed perception of art, which neither reading about art, nor visiting 
museums, nor listening to music in concerts can substitute. Although the experience did 
not turn me into an artist, it helped me understand that while algorithmic computers and 
looms are equivalent in many ways, they were also essentially different. The weaver did not 
need a control system – she had her own anticipation. In words I did not own at that time, 
this means that the desired outcome (a possible future) informed choices as they were made 
(“on the fly” in the jargon of programmers). You can play the violin by a method (let’s say 
Suzuki), or by letting your own perception of the sounds you generate – what you want to 
hear – guide you. The gypsies of the time when I discovered the loom learned and played 
music by ear (not unlike the musicians of Appalachia, as I discovered way later, away from 
the place where I was born).
Weaving is an interactive anticipatory experience: it is open to randomness, to intuitive 
choices, to spontaneity. Algorithmic computation is an automated process unfolding accord-
ing to a recipe: this is what it takes to draw a line. In hindsight, I understood that on the 
loom, the recipe (“algorithm” is what we call it today) and free choices fuse into the surprise 
and discovery characteristic of art – at least in my understanding of it. Art, as a particular 
expression of creativity, is not reducible to a formula. It is not algorithmic. Production 
(and re-production) is algorithmic. But at that time, I could not come up with such words, 
even less with such an understanding. Clarity is achieved by defining the language used in 
describing what we want to understand. There is no knowledge independent of language 
(which can be the language of mathematics, of chemistry, of music representation, of vis-
ualization, etc.).
In the Romania of that time, of many deprivations, to think freely was even more difficult 
than to get access to a computer (not to mention the necessities of life). It was a polarized 
world: the communist regimes demonized cybernetics and computation as instruments 
of diabolical capitalism conceived predominantly for military purposes. Yet, they used the 
new machines – when they got some – predominantly for spying on the population. The 
ends justify the means! It was in this context that one of Romania’s brightest minds, Grigore 
Moisil, exercised his genius (charm being part of it). And voilà, an IBM 360 arrived at the 
University Computer Center (CCUB), located at Strada Mircea Vulcănescu 125. (Before 
that there was a British ICT machine used for the census and, as mentioned, the machines 
conceived at the Institute for Nuclear Physics.) After Romania built machines (1969, the 
Felix computers), access to computers became somewhat easier. It was a time of opportunity 
for those who realized the potential of automated mathematics.
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It made a difference that early on a distinguished mathematician recognized the oppor-
tunities associated with computers and worked out a plan (dated February 1971, Figure 
5(a)) for a solid education in computer science. His text alone deserves to be discussed one 
day by those who realize that technology is far ahead of our understanding of education in 
the age of computation. (As far as I know, only Edsger W. Dijkstra approached the issue at 
a comparable depth level.) The students were enthusiastic at the prospect of learning about 
the new machine (Figure 5(b)). It meant so much for their future.
For me, computation was already beyond the focus on numbers and calculations faster 
than those a human being could perform. Could it play a role in enabling creative activities? 
Would artists want to continue the tradition of calculating some of their work? (Mozart 
created a game of dice, called Musikalisches Würfelspiel, whereby a pair of dice is rolled 
several times to create a minuet. It was fun to recreate his experiment!)
I wanted to make images and sounds for reasons different from those that motivate artists. 
Fully aware of my more than modest achievements – intersections of curves, attempts at 
describing concave and convex functions, ambitious formal descriptions of what is called 
the dynamics of the image – I showed my images to Moisil (Figure 6).
He gave me his lectures, Lecţii despre logica rationamentului nuanţat (Lectures on 
Nuanced Reasoning). It was also the time I was discovering Zadeh’s fuzzy logic – Romanian 
mathematicians (Negoiţă and Ralescu, 1974) were among the first to associate themselves 
with it. In a society of clear-cut distinctions (“You are with us or against us”, was the official 
slogan), fuzzy was a good place to introduce degrees of belongingness. Fuzzy was to play an 
important role in my attempt to deal with the imprecise characteristic of creative processes.
The dialog with Moisil was way more useful than the many weeks I spent trying to make 
those images. The making of art, in his view, involved, on an intuitive level, multi-valued 
logic – the domain where he felt “at home”. It is an activity that transcends our ability to 
describe how a certain work of art came into being. Many possible choices inform an artist’s 
aesthetic decisions that are pretty unique (the originality factor). Keep in mind: this was 
Romania in 1973 (shortly before Moisil died). Those were visionary thoughts. Many ideas 
Figure 5. (a) moisil prepared a plan for teaching computers in romania. (b) moisil and the first group of 
students who got access to the new machine.
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came up in various conversations with others (some of whom were blacklisted, as I myself 
would eventually be). Mathila Ghyka (ahead of Le Corbusier’s Measure of Man) and Pius 
Servien came to my attention. Since they were living in the West, access to their writings 
was extremely limited. Their names could not be mentioned openly.
Looking back at my early images and considerations of the computer’s role in generating 
aesthetic artifacts, I can identify the questions I was trying to address. Machines are efficient 
in producing sameness, not uniqueness. The living, however, was always expressed uniquely. 
Aristotle thought that no two blades of grass are the same. I would find out, eventually, how 
different living cells are. Moreover, I learned that there was a renewal of the matter from 
which the living is made. Not only does a scratch heal by itself, but all cells are renewed. The 
living is in a continuous state of self-creation. Its own renewal cycles are such that we are 
in a state of always being new (even at old age, although the rhythm of renewal is slowing 
down). The matter making up a stone, or water, or an acid remains pretty much the same. 
Would that mean that algorithmic computers, by their condition, are not conducive to 
creativity? Moreover: all beginnings (of children, ideas, theories, for example) are mimetic. 
Imitation is the first step toward one’s own expression. Are machines bound to remain a 
medium of imitation? For example, Noll, the Bell Lab pioneer of computer graphics, thought 
he was making art when he produced images à la Mondrian. I was too far away from him 
to challenge his views. Deep learning based computations, fashionable in our days, imitate 
not only Mondrian – but this is a different matter. What kind of art can be generated with 
Figure 6. early computer graphics: mathematics and aesthetics.
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computers that could not be made otherwise? A new aesthetics became possible for those 
dedicated to creatively appropriating computational means within an integrative systems 
perspective of art.
To know starts in the act of representation
In addition to Moisil, I had the chance to spend time with Solomon Marcus. His genius 
in bridging between mathematics and semiotics most certainly influenced my intellectual 
path and continues to inspire me. Solomon Marcus encouraged me, and so many others, 
in every possible way. I was trying to read The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 
since semiotics – conceived by Baumgarten as part of aesthetics – came into the larger 
picture. Well, Professor Marcus xeroxed eight massive volumes for me. Today, nobody can 
understand what this meant in a society where access to libraries was a political issue, and 
even Xerox copies were indexed.
The meaning of representation became a subject because Peirce’s semiotics made it clear 
to me that not everything is an expression of quantity, or can be understood only in terms of 
numbers. Art came up in relation to Max Bense’s informational aesthetics: “Nur künstliche 
Kunst!” (Only artificial art) was his provocative formula. Randomness was supposed to 
substitute for the living artist. If this were the case, creativity and the underlying anticipa-
tion would be a random number generator. The myth continues to have currency even in 
our days, especially among those producing deterministic theories of how and why art is 
created. In touch with the Stuttgart School – famous for stimulating the first computer art 
show in Europe at the Galerie Niedlich, Stuttgart, November 1965 – I wanted my images 
to be acknowledged not for their artistry, but rather for the questions arising from making 
them. The curiosity of those who coalesced around the rather temperamental master that 
Bense was led to an invitation to join their group. They were very dedicated to Peirce’s 
semiotics, better known in Europe than in the USA. Frieder Nake was one of them. The 
mathematician turned computer science professor and artist of the computation age – yes, 
he is an artist – remains a close friend to these days. Aesthetics, semiotics, and computer 
graphics, occasionally Marx, who inspired Nake’s social and political activism, are subjects 
upon which we endlessly dwell.
The dogmatic, deterministic perspective of the Stuttgart School, where information aes-
thetics was first defined, worried me. David Birkhoff, whose name is usually associated with 
the ergodic theorem (as well as with anti-Semitism), introduced, in 1933, the Aesthetic 
Measure (title of his book) – which Bense liked since it quantified aesthetic descriptions. 
Information aesthetics was not compatible with what my research taught me: creativity is an 
expression of anticipatory processes unfolding only in open systems. Knowledge acquisition 
starts with descriptions of reality, quite often in terms close to fuzzy descriptions. (Bense 
could not stomach the notion of fuzzy sets.) The Humboldt grant awarded to me (1978) 
was associated with Bense and Stuttgart University. To be hosted by a prestigious academic 
institution, supportive of my accomplishments, was enticing. To work with an intolerant 
famous colleague was less attractive. Therefore, I was prepared to sacrifice the award out of 
principle. The grant was saved by the legendary Wolfgang Stegmüller, of the Institute for 
Philosophy, Logic and Theory of Science at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. 
He did not question my fundamental position, but wanted it established on a firm logical 
foundation. Stegmüller was dedicated to scientific philosophy (in the spirit of the Vienna 
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Circle), and enjoyed the company of those who shared in the rationality of knowledge acqui-
sition (embodied in his Institute’s program) and of Erkenntnis (the journal he published with 
Hempel and Elser). It was not a compromise – second best to Bense – rather, a chance: at 
that time Stegmüller authored about incompleteness and undecidability (Unvollständigkeit 
und Unentscheidbarkeit, 1959), a subject already on my own agenda. (Reading Gödel was 
one of the first things I did after settling in Munich.)
Value theory
Basically, I escaped from Romania – the regime later sentenced me in absentia for never 
returning. My family (a USA-born wife who, heroically, settled in Bucharest in the grey 
years of Ceausescu’s dictatorship, and our three very young children) remained in Bucharest, 
hostages to vouch for my return. Taking advantage of the political reality between the pow-
erful USA and a Romania that wanted better trade relations, my wife succeeded in obtaining 
visas for our children (whom the Romanians considered their citizens). We reunited after 
I had started research in the elegant environment of a university conveniently located near 
the famous Englisher Garten. To express gratitude to all those who helped, in Romania and 
abroad, is significant for how I understand the connection between what we believe in, 
what we share with our students, and what we actually do in order to make our ideals part 
of reality. A comprehensive value theory, as I was trying to establish, could not escape this 
basic understanding of the relation between what is real and what is possible.
Zadeh’s possibility theory (1978), sketched rather summarily in his first paper on the 
subject, was inspirational. Over time, the idea it expressed percolated in the description 
of anticipatory systems. But what helped most in expressing my own views was the new 
mathematics of Category Theory. It was significant for Rosen – who got it from the source 
(Eilenberg in New York and MacLane in Chicago) – and was of direct use in the value theory 
I proposed. I had no idea at that time who Rosen was, or what he was studying, never mind 
the mathematics he adopted. He wanted to work in the mathematics of biology; my focus 
was on the scientific foundation of a theory of creativity and the underlying anticipation. 
But independent of each other we adopted a particular form of mathematical description 
of the subject we were pursuing. What was decisive is that it dealt with structural properties 
rather than quantitative distinctions. For me, system is always associated with process, and 
at that time Category Theory was the closest language we had for describing process. More 
than 50 years later, I learned that in the Soviet Union a distinguished group of researchers 
(from physiology, psychology, brain science, linguistics, etc.) were trying to capture their 
early ideas regarding anticipation expression through some mathematical description. To 
this end, Gelfand, Latash, Tsetlin, Feldman, and others interacted with Bernstein, Anokhin, 
Ukhtomsky, Uznadze, Beritashvili, and their colleagues.
What distinguishes our respective choices is reflected in the fact that semiotics became 
the entry to the knowledge I was seeking. More precisely, representation. In order to know 
something, we represent it and actually work on representations. This applies to everything 
of gnoseological interest. The formalism of Category Theory allowed me to reconstruct semi-
otics in a language that reflects awareness of relations. “Nothing is a sign unless represented 
as a sign” means nothing other than the category sign, and the associated morphisms (sign 
operations) standing for the sign process (semiosis) leading to meaning. With this in mind, 
and enjoying the intellectual context of discussions with mathematicians and logicians, the 
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work on value became my Habilitierungsschrift – the dissertation for the highest academic 
degree, which entitles the person to teach in a university (facultas docendi). It was published 
(G. Narr Verlag, 1990), to a rather limited readership. Written in German, the book advanced 
ideas upon which my future contributions rest. In particular, distinguishing between the 
meaning and data domains. Data are significant only to the extent they are associated with 
meaning. This association takes place in the living, at all its levels: from cells to the whole 
organism, and to interactions between living entities and the world. It does not take place 
in non-living embodiments. Finally, the distinction between the decidable and the unde-
cidable (which eventually became the criterion of complexity I am advancing these days) 
goes back to that time.
The MIND
What the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (Santa Barbara, under the direc-
tion of Robert Hutchins) became to Robert Rosen (many of his original contributions are 
associated with the Center), the Institut für Philosophie, Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie at 
Ludwig Maximilian University became for me. Distinguished colleagues, such as Godehard 
Link, Felix Mülhölzer, Wolfgang Spohn, et al., engaged me in lively discussions and chal-
lenged my views. Stegmüller wished that I follow him as the director of the Institute (at 
his retirement, 1990); but I had my own agenda. Those who would like to reconstruct it 
from my successive appointments would have a difficult time. I taught Design Theory and 
Semiotics at the University of Essen; taught Philosophy and Semiotics (respectively, in the 
Schools of Liberal Arts and Design) at the Rhode Island School of Design (the “Harvard of 
the Arts”), where I introduced computers in art and design education; taught (as adjunct 
faculty) at Brown University (participating in the Electronic Book project initiated by Andy 
van Dam – the preeminent computer graphics guru of America – and Steve Feiner, cur-
rently at Columbia University); interacted with the Media Lab at MIT (offering classes in 
the semiotics of the visual and in interface design); and was appointed Eminent Scholar 
in Art and Design Technology (a chair endowed by the State of Ohio) at The Ohio State 
University (Columbus). In Columbus, I elaborated a plan for an Advanced Computing 
Center in Art and Design (ACCAD). A counter-proposal was the Center for Advanced 
Computing in the Arts (CACA; the acronym explains why the group took over my title, 
but not the plan). Theirs was a mechanistic-driven program, producing more and more 
of the flying logos that fill our monitors (TV or computer graphics). They expected me to 
align with their understanding of creativity as a machine outcome.
In the Panel Session on The Aesthetics of Computer Graphics that I chaired at SIGGRAPH 
‘85, the subject of creativity vs. automated machine production of images was passionately 
debated. Out of the entire panel only the late Hiroshi Kawano of Japan, himself distin-
guished in system theory, understood my argument. Indeed, I offended computer graphics 
industry leaders speaking about the dangers of “canned” art and suggesting that “If you saw 
one computer image you saw them all”. Art by recipe is ontologically different from that of 
intention-driven creative processes.
Academia is famous for the reckless politics through which egos are expressed and less 
than honorable goals are pursued. In a day and age of obsession with funding at any price 
integrity is often the victim. Many have written about it – most famously, John Simon (in 
New York Magazine): “The intensity of hatred, infighting, and back-stabbing increases with 
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the marginality of a profession …”. Rosen experienced it in ways that affected his activity 
and his health. Remember his testimony – “… brutal upwelling of resentments, jealousies, 
and low parochial politics” – in describing how the Center for Theoretical Biology at SUNY-
Buffalo was abolished (in 1967).
The experience in the “golden cage” of the endowed chair at ACCAD caused an initial 
shock. Under communism, university administrators forced faculty members to execute 
party plans. In a free society, one expected, idealistically, that the best ideas would succeed. It 
did not happen. Tenure protects the employment of a faculty member, but not the freedom 
of creation. The Dean (who misrepresented the expectations associated with my endowed 
chair), together with a master of tackling football player (at the level of All American Hall 
of Fame) seeking glory in the illusion of commercial art, undermined my research because 
I would not align it to their agenda. In short, since my views, which I was not willing to 
compromise, conflicted with those of who were in control, I ended up isolated. Shunned by 
those who attracted me to OSU, I resigned (a tenured endowed chair!). It was a blessing that 
the system did not suck me in. Building upon research done in Munich and continued in 
Columbus, my lecture at the Graduate School introduced a new theory: Mind – Anticipation 
and Chaos. It is a dynamic systems mind theory that submits the hypothesis that mind 
processes are anticipatory in nature. The lecture was the basis for a (flattering) publication 
under the same title, in the Belser Presse series Milestones in Thought and Discovery (1991). 
(In this series, Belser published, for example, facsimile editions of Leibniz’s text on his dig-
ital system of notation, texts by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, William Harvey, Werner 
Heisenberg.) With this book started my short interaction with Robert Rosen, who wanted 
to read the book, as I wanted to read his. It is almost impossible to express gratitude to those 
colleagues who give us the gift of their consideration, even during tough times. Without 
interaction we can get choked in our own insecurity and doubts. At 1501 Neil Avenue in 
Columbus, at the Cranston Center, I felt like those who were forced to wear their Yellow 
Star in the ghettoes of Europe.
A second Cartesian revolution
Anticipation is definitory of the living. Acknowledging anticipatory processes, which empir-
ical evidence suggests underlie evolution, is the premise for seeking knowledge of how 
change affects the living. It necessarily leads to the understanding that the Cartesian view 
of the world, i.e. the reductionist–deterministic description of physical processes, has to be 
complemented, in Niels Bohr’s sense of complementarity, with a holistic non-deterministic 
view of life.
In respect to these hypotheses, which result from a rather intense teaching and research 
activity, a short biographic detour becomes necessary. For mainstream research, there are 
quite a number of paths that can be pursued. This is an age of a very rapidly expanding base 
for academic activity. Society can afford the luxury of stimulating research, even in view of 
relatively low return on the investment. In our days, as in the past, of research at the mercy 
of those who finance it, opportunism dictates the scientific agenda. And obsession with 
high returns (profit) eliminates (or undermines) everything else. To align oneself with the 
dominant direction is understandable. To challenge dominant views is the exception. Rosen 
challenged biologists and ended up in a decently funded position in Nova Scotia – far from 
where an intellectual of his talent and originality should have been. But that did not prevent 
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him from pursuing his agenda and from publishing. Without suggesting any comparison to 
Rosen, or to anyone else who experienced the same (such as Walter Elsasser), I take note that 
swimming against the current can be difficult at times. C. S. Peirce, about whom Bertrand 
Russell wrote that he was “certainly the greatest American thinker ever” (cf. Wisdom of the 
West. Paul Foulkes, ed. London: Crescent, 1977. p. 276) had a similar destiny.
My chair in Computational Design at the University of Wuppertal gave me what German 
University professors still have: a certain autonomy. Computational Design, a discipline I 
founded (1994), advanced the notion that design is anticipatory, and that computation, in 
embodiments different from the algorithmic (non-Turing machines, AI, embedded hybrid 
analog and digital processing) can serve in the design process. It was by no accident that at 
the Emeritierung ceremony – one is retired at age 65 – I presented my book Anticipation: 
The End is Where We Start From (basing the title on a line from T. S. Elliot’s Little Gidding), 
superbly put in page by Uwe Loesch. I also reported on the antÉ Institute for Research 
in Anticipatory Systems (initially incorporated as non-profit in Germany). The Institute 
came with me, more a shell than anything else (all the funding stayed behind in Germany), 
but was eventually welcomed at the University of Texas at Dallas (UTD) – where it is still 
hosted. Ambitious projects (Seneludens, Classifying Human Motion, Anticipation and Risk 
Assessment, Hybrid Control Systems, Virtual Architecture, Anticipatory Computing, etc.) 
were begun. The Institute, the first known entity fully dedicated to the study of anticipa-
tion, enjoys a growing membership. Indeed, the Institute is dedicated to establishing a 
shared knowledge foundation and to promoting cooperative efforts. At UTD, I designed 
and implemented the first experimental environment for quantifying anticipation – the 
AnticipationScopeTM – or at least for acquiring data documenting anticipatory processes, in 
particular anticipatory expression and its physiological correlates. (This work was reported 
in an IJGS article, “The anticipatory profile. An attempt to describe anticipation as process”, 
2012.) In 2013, I discovered Nikolai A. Bernstein’s cyclography and kymocyclography (from 
the late 1920s). His focus was on the correlation between the motoric expression and phys-
iological activity, which, in different contexts, we both pursued.
Most important in the activity of the antÉ Institute is the collaboration with Hanse 
Institute for Advanced Studies (Hanse Wissenschaftskolleg, Delmenhorst, Germany). At 
the Institute I enjoyed a one-year sabbatical that resulted in various publications and pres-
entations. Since 2012, the Hanse Institute hosts a Study Group in Anticipation, which has 
so far organized three major international conferences: Anticipation: Learning from the 
Past. The Russian/Soviet Contributions to the Science of Anticipation; Anticipation Across 
Disciplines; Anticipation and Medicine. These were major efforts, and resulted in three vol-
umes (in Springer Publishers Cognitive Systems Monographs) and an IJGS special issue, 
Russian experimental and empirical contributions informed by an anticipatory perspective 
(with Andres Kurismaa as co-editor).
Understanding anticipation
Over time, anticipation expression of all kinds – i.e. successful actions that preserve life and 
help reach desired outcomes – has afforded a rich body of empirical evidence. However, 
experimental evidence, in the strict sense of the practice of creating closed systems within 
which causality can be tested, is practically non-existent. I would go as far as to claim that 
the vast majority of experiments involving the living (medical, psychological, sociological, 
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etc.) are suggestive of the extent to which scientists will go to force physics-based descrip-
tions on reality. When 80% of such experiments cannot be replicated, the message is clear: 
the hypothesis under whose guidance they are performed is wrong. Nevertheless, reduc-
ing the living to physics has become the priority in government-supported funding, and 
informs editorial policies of leading journals – exactly those publishing results of misguided 
so-called experiments.
In recent years, data pertinent to anticipatory processes have been systematically accumulated 
in a variety of fields of knowledge. This evidence triggered a plethora of  explanatory attempts – 
some anchored in science of unquestionable integrity, the majority, however, rather speculative. 
The latter are usually derived from ill-defined concepts, or, worse, through less than grounded 
generalizations. In particular, the notion of “anticipation” itself is usually confused with other 
descriptions of change, such as forecasting, expectation, and guessing, and  especially prediction. 
Conceptual clarity, more than instrumental obsession – let’s measure it, we have the technology 
for it – so typical of this particular time, is necessary. Everything is  measured – because it can be 
– in the hope that “big-data” technology will reveal “secrets” behind the data. The assumption is 
that all processes, regardless of their nature, are reducible to data based upon which prediction, 
forecasting, guessing, etc. are performed. Two aspects have been ignored: 1. data processing 
carries with it assumptions that ultimately falsify the data; 2. actions informed by anticipation, 
i.e. as an expression of life, are the outcome of significant data – usually “little” data, generated 
ahead of the action. Moreover, the emphasis in anticipatory processes is on meaning rather than 
on quantitative descriptions based on the use of numbers.
If the above lines of this report read as a synopsis, it is because it left out the many inter-
actions with colleagues interested in the subject. At Stanford University, Terry Winograd, 
whose disappointment with the mechanistic view of AI, placed him at the periphery of the 
computer hype. We discussed what he defines as lack of progress in computation regarding 
creativity, insight, and judgment. The combination between my anticipatory perspective 
and semiotic considerations helped build a relation reflected in the study I wrote during 
my short tenure at the Center for the Study of Language and Information (Anticipation – 
A Spooky Computation, 1999). During the same time, Paul Pangaro (so close to Gordon 
Pask’s goal-directed systems) facilitated productive encounters with Heinz von Foerster at 
his Pescadero residence. “Die Ursache liegt in der Zukunft” (The cause lies in the future), a 
formulation bearing von Foerster’s signature, became a suggestive definition of anticipation 
from the perspective of purposefulness. Like Winograd, who eventually ended up advising 
the founders of Google, Lotfi Zadeh proved to be an inspirational host during my activity 
at UC-Berkeley. In his Foreword to my book mentioned above, Zadeh suggests that a per-
ception-based form of computation could eventually help in expressing anticipation. I still 
hope that some of his students will follow up on this idea. The dialog with Zadeh continues 
to this date – so much to learn from him.
Discoveries
UC-Berkeley also meant my discovery of Walter Elsasser. Harry Rubin, Professor Emeritus of 
Molecular Biology, wrote the introduction to Elsasser’s Reflections on a Theory of Organisms. 
Holism in Biology. This is a very relevant attempt, by a reputable physicist (who worked with 
Schrödinger, among others), to establish a foundation of biology that reflected its specific 
condition. One quote from Rubin’s text: “Elsasser argues … that the structural complexity 
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of even a single living cell is ‘transcomputational’ – that is, beyond the power of any imag-
inable system to compute”. Beginning from this insight, Elsasser leads the reader through 
a step-by-step process that ultimately arrives at the conclusion that living and non-living 
matter are separated by “a no-man’s land of irrationality”.
That Elsasser and Rosen, each on his own path to define the living, arrived at the same 
conclusion regarding computation deserves a short digression (for the sake of principle). My 
own views are informed by an understanding of computation that benefits from the reali-
zation that there are forms of data processing, such as interactive computation, that make 
anticipatory expression possible (Anticipatory and Predictive Computation, Encyclopaedia of 
Computer Science and Technology, 2016). Neither Elsasser nor Rosen, even less myself, would 
claim that he was the first to question the validity of the Second Law of Thermodynamics 
in the realm of the living. Claiming credit for one idea or another, or being given credit, is 
quite different from practicing science as a sports competition (Who came first?). Ideas are 
part of the larger architecture; they are related to other ideas. This is what justifies them. 
There is evidence that Elsasser was denied a Nobel Prize because of what critics identified 
as his vitalism – and this despite his arguments against vitalists. In the 1930s, Beritashvili, 
another Soviet precursor of a science of anticipation, defined the spatial navigation system 
for which a Nobel Prize in physiology was awarded many years later, in 2014, to others. 
His contribution was not even brought up in relation to the historic record. Rosen, in 
whose name a prize was awarded at a self-styled conference misusing his concept (after he 
was un-invited to it, during his last year of life!), never received the recognition his work 
deserved. Ironically, his mentor, Nicholas Rashevsky, founder of mathematical biology, had 
the same experience. He came up, just to give an example, with the first model of neural 
networks, but credit is given to one of his students.
Given Rubin’s work in cancer research, we had many conversations on the subject. The 
most prominent medical innovations are the attempts at surgical removal of the cancerous 
growth, medication to halt proliferation, establishing a “firewall” (where laser treatment comes 
into the picture) for containment. All these methods are based on the deterministic model 
of cause-and-effect associated with grueling chemotherapy (itself a major innovation that, 
despite its side effects, has helped save many lives). Albeit, no cure for cancer has been dis-
covered or invented. Rubin realized that the question to be asked is not “How do we get rid 
of something as organic as life itself, without getting rid of life at the same time?” His data, 
collected over decades, show that as long as healthy cells surrounding cancerous cells keep 
the latter in check, no cancer develops. My own hypothesis, articulated in those days, is that 
stimulating anticipatory capabilities, characteristic of the living, is probably the answer. Instead 
of dwelling on the innovation that pills and surgery represent, let us examine the information 
exchanged by cells, and identify under which circumstances healthy cells no longer recognize 
in advance the dangers associated with the unchecked proliferation of cancerous cells.
Mediocrity is corrosive
One suggestion for anyone seeking interaction: stay away from mediocrity. It is corrosive. 
Those who have earned respect and recognition are usually eager to broaden their horizon. 
I am not willing to name (or even further allude to) the mediocrities that made work more 
difficult, in ways that recall the destinies of Bernstein in the Soviet Union and of some of 
my professors in Romania. Bertalanffy’s experience, Elsasser’s marginalization, and Rosen’s 
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difficult academic path are examples not to be forgotten. When science becomes a matter 
of opportunism, of ideology, of unprincipled competition for funding, of vanity, of enter-
tainment even, we all lose. An abusive provost screaming at faculty members or a lying 
dean (recruiting talent with false promises) is part of a pathology shared by totalitarian 
communism and corrupt capitalism. Rosen wrote explicitly about such phenomena because, 
as an intellectual of integrity, he could not ignore their poisonous influence. The painful 
memories of scientists forced to recant theories not aligned with dogma are from a reality 
that affected destinies and the development of science.
My invitation to Zadeh to speak at UTD occasioned his advice: “Energy wasted in chal-
lenging authority has no return in our work”. Of course, he discovered what it means to stick 
to ideas not aligned with the most recent fad. In many instances, we talked about the need to 
overcome the extreme segmentation that marks our time. During Vint Cerf ’s visit to the antÉ 
Lab, I wanted to hear from the then ACM President why Lotfi Zadeh was never awarded the 
Turing Prize. For the record: Vint Cerf belongs to those who did not need my prompting. 
He was, by the way, swift in asking for the reasons that led to my decision to resign from 
the ACM. As an organization of professionals in computation, ACM never questioned the 
role computation plays in making possible the never-ending wars the USA started, the 
mediocrity of computer products (which Dijkstra long ago deplored), the surveillance of 
everyone, the submission of computer science education to corporate expectations. Let us 
be clear: social aspects of anticipation are not a marginal subject. Rosen took note in his 
report that “social structures realize relational patterns which individual organisms do”. 
When this ceases to be the case, the open system is actually closed, its dynamics changed – a 
phenomenon we notice in the USA of our days. The sustainability of the American way of 
life, envied by everyone else who makes it possible, is a matter of anticipation.
A question of scientific legitimacy
What often undermines the attempt to suggest a new perspective is the reductionist ten-
dency: open system, it has been argued, is actually a closed system “canonically perturbed” 
(Rosen’s words); non-determinism is actually determinism. Non-deterministic Turing 
machines (NTM) are, according to this view, equivalent to deterministic Turing machines 
(DTM). This goes as far as to claim that DTMs can simulate NTMs. The same kind of 
thinking suggests that non-algorithmic computation can be simulated on Turing machines 
(algorithmic by definition). Most egregious, but with the longest tradition, is the belief that 
a holistic view is preserved within the reductionist methodology, despite the evidence that 
each reduction means a loss of information. Even the unfortunate idea that data is infor-
mation belongs to the same. Anticipation defines the living as a dynamic interactive open 
system. Anticipatory processes, holistically engaging the system, are expressed in action. 
They are non-deterministic. The living does not know repetition – unlike machines. Some 
anticipation action succeeds, some does not. Between the creative effort and the pathology 
of delusion, the distance is smaller than we would like to acknowledge. Superstition is not 
so far from insight and inspiration as generally assumed.
It was not an apple falling from a tree (and the equation describing it) that gave legitimacy 
to the law of gravity. Newton advanced an understanding of physical law that revolutionized 
science, and continues to have practical relevance. The same can be said in respect to the 
theory of relativity: Einstein became more famous for e = mc2 than for the revolutionary 
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view of the universe that his mathematics advanced. It might be that quantum mechanics, 
still at the forefront of science today, qualifies as well as a revolution in thought and dis-
covery. The fact that particular aspects of quantum mechanics (such as entanglement and 
non-locality) fascinate the public (and even some scientists) should not affect awareness 
of a totally new view of reality.
Human dedication to understanding the world, within which the living unfolds, even-
tually crystalizes in revolutionary views. This in itself is worth celebrating, but it invites 
reflection as well. Nothing comparable, not even the famous DNA helix, is on record in 
explaining life itself. Newton, Einstein, the quantum mechanics visionaries (Heisenberg, 
Schrödinger, Bohr, Feynman, among others) are present – and rightly so – in the explanation 
(as tentative as it still is) of the beginnings of the universe. But the beginning of life is still in 
the fog of confusion. The attempts to start life from non-life, almost as seductive as alchemy 
(which Newton upheld), take new forms (Venter’s claim is only one among many). They 
entail a rather disconcerting surrender, celebrated as victory: since the living is embodied 
in matter, the more physics we know – and the more physics-based biology we use – the 
better we will understand life. The obsession of particle physics (i.e. know the particles and 
you will know all about the whole they are part of) translated into the hope that molecular 
biology or genetics will eventually solve all the mysteries of disease and, eventually, of life. 
Supervenience is an expression of the same.
Obviously, there is much more nuance to all of this. So far, science consists mainly of 
convincing physics theories and their extension into particular phenomena (chemistry, 
for instance). The material substratum is acknowledged without reservation; omitted is 
the understanding that the dynamics of the physical and of the living are different. Also 
absent is the distinct effort to advance a view of the living that defines its own characteristic 
causality. This might integrate the science of the physical – e.g. physics, chemistry, geology, 
meteorology – without discarding what defines a science of the living proper. The episte-
mological effort that I argue for might even arrive at the realization that physical causality 
(explaining change in the non-living) is a subset of the extremely rich types of causality 
that explains change in life.
For accomplishing such a daunting task, the focus should be on dynamics: how and why 
change takes place. Empirical evidence suggests that change in the non-living realm takes 
place at a timescale different from the many timescales characteristic of living processes. 
Moreover, in the physical, the timescale is relatively constant. In the living it varies under the 
influence of context – sometimes defined as Umwelt (cf. Uexküll), i.e. the perceptual world 
of a specific being: “Organisms are subjects interpreting their life worlds, not mechanical 
objects reacting to external forces”. There is no birth and no death (short of misappropriated 
metaphors applied to stars and black holes) in the physical. And there is, contrary to poetic 
license, no intentionality either to be observed or experimentally documented.
The above is not mentioned merely for the sake of theory. It would benefit the commu-
nity of researchers to have Rosen’s contributions at the Center for the Study of Democratic 
Institutions (1976–1977) made available in a critical edition. The subjects addressed remain 
of undiminished actuality. Let me mention here “Some Temporal Aspects of Political 
Change”; “On the Design of Stable and Reliable Institutions”; “Environmental Challenges 
and Political Challenges”; comments on Watergate, etc. In one of these texts, the following 
aphorism comes up: “… it is much more dangerous to be misinformed than to be ignorant” 
(“Some Comments on Global Science Policies”, 1973). At times, the writing reads like a 
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commentary on current life in America (and in the world). The relational patterns in the 
living that Rosen noticed and generalized to political, economic, and cultural aspects are, 
of course, different from those I addressed in The Civilization of Illiteracy (1997, Dresden 
University Press).
The Civilization of Illiteracy
The cover of the book, an image I designed with the goal of synthesizing what almost 900 
pages of text analyze, is self-explanatory (Figure 7).
If the reader of our days sees in this almost 20-year-old image the present of net-
works, globalization, the digital library, the iPad, or the iPhone (and similar interactive 
devices), the author can be satisfied. But most important is the realization that this 
image is about a fundamental change: from a system defined by permanence, continuity, 
hierarchy, centralism, sequentiality, determinism, and locality, in which any progress 
was slow in coming (all characteristics of the pre-industrial society leading to industrial 
society,) to one of rapid change, transitoriness, decentralism, heterogeneity, distributed 
tasks, globality, parallelism, and discontinuity. Umberto Eco, a colleague I was allowed 
to call friend, realized the purpose of the book and endorsed it (as he endorsed many 
colleagues). After arriving in the USA (in 1980), I took note of the fact that in the most 
effective economy on Earth, the majority of the population was functionally illiterate! 
But very successful.
The book is the outcome of a dynamic systems-based research of the transition from 
a society stubbornly pursuing the ideal of literacy against the reality of many literacies – 
required by the specialization necessarily resulting from continuously mediated forms of 
work and life – and no form of permanence. It presents the proof that the past (as in past 
states of an open system) does not inform the present (current states,) and even less the 
future (possible future states). Many of the ideas in the book slowly came into the cultural 
discourse, and were so to say “re-authored”. A new concept for education in the age of 
interaction is but one example.
Pericles’ idiotes, describing those worried only about themselves, inspired the book 
Are you Stupid? A Second Revolution might save America from herself. The outcome of the 
Figure 7. Cover of The Civilization of Illiteracy (computer image realized with the cooperation of thomas 
overberg and Stefan lehmann).
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systems analysis is straightforward: the current situation in the USA (and for that matter 
in the world) is rather the expression of the failure of politics to be anticipatory. When 
poll-driven politics succumbs to the reactive mode, every situation looks like a crack that 
needs patching, even after the bridge collapsed. Those interested in political anticipation (a 
growing field in Europe) need to be aware of the difference between the two. To this effect, 
the UNESCO Chairs in Anticipation, an international conference on the subject (Trento, 
2015), and a doctoral program in anticipatory engineering (University of Reading, UK) 
are part of the record. The organizers of the second conference on anticipation (London, 
November 8–10, 2017) suggested a framework for presenting my views (on anticipation 
and change). Nothing better can happen to our work than to see it acknowledged, sooner 
or later, by becoming part of the new consciousness – whether credit for the original ideas 
is given or not.
A genuine science of the living
A genuine science of the living – not applied physics and chemistry, not even  computational 
models – has to be grounded in the notion of life. So far, Rosen’s description, “A material 
system is an organism if and only if it is closed to efficient causation” – with its implicit 
reference to the Aristotelian view of causality – is the only attempt at a foundation of 
a genuine science of the living. Defining life in terms of our ability to know what it is 
(while we ourselves are part of it) was prompted by Gödel’s decidability. Indeed, life is 
manifest above the threshold of G-complexity, which means, in reference to the human 
being as observer, in the undecidable. Consonant with Uexküll in respect to meaning, 
and with Elsasser in respect to creativity, my view of life suggests interactivity as the 
overarching entailment of change. It is always expressed in action. It is the nature of 
change in the living that entails actions (ranging from long-term adaptive processes to 
immediate autonomic avoidance of danger). Thus, anticipation becomes definitory of 
the living. It is always expressed in action preceding change. Actions engage the entirety 
of the organism (plant or animal). Accordingly, a genuine science of the living can only 
be holistic.
The realization that physical causality could be a subset of natural causality might 
entail the need to understand “Nature” beyond Newton’s unifying view that aggregates 
the living and the physical and declares the laws of physics – reflecting God’s control 
over the universe – as universal. Eliminating God from the picture, Darwin’s Origin 
of Species (1859) was celebrated as the equivalent of Newton’s foundation of phys-
ics (Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, 1687). Natural selection describes 
the implicit dynamics of the living. It is, of course, of a precision different from that 
afforded by Newton’s equations. In order for the theory of evolution to make sense, 
it has to refocus away from the determinism everyone wants to see confirmed onto a 
new understanding, one that integrates non-determinism (which is not the same as 
randomness!). The refocused view of evolution as driven by anticipation and being 
non-deterministic could help us better understand it. Some species succeeded against 
the evolutionary odds; other failed, even when everything within Darwin’s theory (and 
its more modern versions) guaranteed their success.
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Determinism, the characteristic causality of physical phenomena, is relevant to the phys-
ics of the living. But it returns an incomplete explanation of the changing living. Just to 
present an example along this line: physical forces (e.g. pulls, compressions and stretching, 
distortions) applied to a cell can further affect it, probably more than the inherited genetic 
code does. Taking both physical forces and the genetic code into consideration affords an 
understanding of cell changes that neither can deliver alone. Non-determinism, describing 
a relation between cause and effect offering a multitude of possible outcomes, pertains to 
change as an expression of something being alive. Indeed, changes due to physical forces 
applied on cells (e.g. a cut or a blow) and genetic processes governing all dynamics are 
interwoven. There is no way to unequivocally predict whether the cell becomes cancerous 
or simply divides in a process of self-healing. The living is the domain of “repetition with-
out repetition” (Bernstein), i.e. non-monotonic change. This is a data-supported argument 
in favor of transcending the machine view characteristic of Cartesian determinism and 
reductionism.
The question of legitimacy
The question of legitimacy, as it pertains to the anticipatory perspective, transcends the 
theoretical. It has consequences for the way we conceive of means and methods for main-
taining life: the domain of medicine (but not only). To know how the physical changes 
is to infer from a quantitatively described past state to a future state, under assumptions 
usually defined as initial conditions (also expressed numerically). To know how the living 
changes is to integrate inferences from past states with interpretations of the meaning of 
possible future states. No falling stone will get hurt (not to say die); a falling living being 
(cat, human being) can get hurt (and even die). The framing of change within the respective 
consequence is key to understanding their difference. The causality specific to interactions 
in the physical realm is described in Newtonian laws – action–reaction, in particular. The 
causality specific to interactions in the living includes, in addition to what Newton’s laws 
describe quantitatively, the realization of meaning in connection to the possible future, i.e. 
anticipation. This explains the variable phase space of the living.
The anticipatory perspective is the alternative – a new frontier in science. But it is not 
as comfortable as the beaten path of physics and its promise for technology. It took over 
200 years (more precisely, since Newton, Descartes, and Laplace) for scientists and scholars 
to realize that the beaten path at best offers partial answers (often wrong) to the question 
of what change means in the living. Therefore, one cannot expect abrupt abandonment of 
the huge investment (time, energy, money, human lives, and the lives of animals used in 
experiments) in following the wrong path. Against the background of scientific advance-
ment, we can hope for a shorter time for ascertaining a complementary view. We should 
start by applying it to situations for which physics-based medicine is not adequate. The aging 
of the world population is only one aspect; the degeneration of the species – expressed in, 
among other ways, systemic disorders and debilitating spectrum conditions – is probably 
an even more critical problem. Conditioned by its own reductionist-deterministic theology 
(cf. arXiv:1612.02491v1), humankind is progressively losing anticipatory abilities (at both 
the individual and the societal levels).
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The irreproducible and undecidable
When in particular domains 80% of published results, from researchers who earned the 
respect of their peers, proved to be irreproducible, something might be off with the expec-
tation that research, no matter which subject or purpose, is best validated through repro-
ducible experiments. So far, the reproducibility–irreproducibility crisis has encouraged 
finger-pointing and palliatives (crowd-sourcing is one), but not critical re-evaluation of 
the means and methods of research.
The crisis of reproducibility, which the American National Academies is examining as 
well, should not go to waste. It is an opportunity for opening a discussion of the relation 
between various knowledge domains and the need to adapt research methods to the spe-
cific dynamics of the subject that scientists attempt to describe. The worldview according 
to physics gave way to a multitude of perspectives, sometimes antagonistic, other times 
complementary. Unfortunately this progress is not yet reflected in the need to transcend 
the presumptions of knowledge acquisition through experiment, regardless of the particular 
epistemological condition of change in various domains.
After vitalism was debunked, science gave up the distinction between the living and 
the non-living. This in itself is significant. Scientists never discard a question because a 
wrong answer was given. Elsasser’s and Rosen’s foundational works in defining the living 
were pretty much ignored at the time they were published. Their respective arguments, 
quite different in their perspectives, deserve a closer look at this moment of questioning 
research and validation methods. The vast majority of irreproducible experiments pertain 
to the living. This in itself is indicative of an inadequacy of what science does in dealing 
with what is alive. The living is heterogenous, purposeful, and anticipatory; the non-living 
is homogenous, purpose-free, and reactive. To know is to be aware of distinctions as they 
pertain to change – especially those of a fundamental nature.
Taking Gödel’s concept of decidability (the logic of incompleteness pertinent to axiomatic 
systems used in arithmetic operations) and applying it to defining knowledge domains is an 
opportunity. In this view, a subject is decidable if it can be fully and consistently described. 
But the focus in this alternative view is not on Gödel’s rigorous logical proof, as it is on the 
notion of decidability, extended here from the formal domain to that of reality.
Indeed, physics, astronomy, geology, and knowledge domains where reproducibility is 
close to 100% represent descriptions that can be complete and consistent. The threshold 
from the decidable to the undecidable is the so-called G-complexity (G for Gödel, obviously). 
The living, in its unlimited variety of ever-changing forms is G-complex, i.e. characterized 
by undecidability. As a consequence, to expect experiments involving the living (of inter-
est not only to psychology, but also to the biomedical sciences, not to mention molecular 
biology, genetics, brain science, etc.) to be reproducible is equivalent to reducing the living 
to its physical substratum, and biology to physics. Too often, such experiments turn out to 
be mere instances of conditioning (psychology outperforms every other known discipline 
in this respect). The outcome is nothing more than testimony to how well the subject 
was conditioned (the Pavlovian model)! This level of limited understanding of causality 
is occasionally transcended in modern science (and not only in the quantum mechanics 
perspective). Back in the 1940s and 1950s, Bernstein, critical of Pavlov’s model of reflexes, 
studied neuro-motorics from a perspective that integrated the goal-oriented expression of 
human action. Nevertheless, the views he (and others) questioned still dominate.
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Mapping from an open system (extending from the cell to the human being) of extreme 
dynamics to the closed system of the experiment (which by definition is supposed to be 
decidable) might result in reproducibility; but in the final analysis, it undermines the valid-
ity of the findings. More recently, brain activity has become the object of computational 
modeling – a lucrative opportunity for computer science. There is much to gain from 
computational models, but their intrinsic limitation stems from the fact that algorithmic 
computation captures only the deterministic aspects of change. Therefore, the guaranteed 
reproducibility of computational neuroscience experiments conjures knowledge and vali-
dation not about the brain, whose deterministic and non-deterministic aspects complement 
each other, but about computation.
As impressive as the Human Genome Project was, it is a good example of irreproducible 
experiments. It was generated under the reductionist assumptions of a blueprint – published 
as such by Science – of homo sapiens that does not change over time. The 1000 Genomes 
Project, aimed at studying variation (initially ignored) is proof of yet another irreproduci-
ble experiment. An assumption similar to that of the Human Genome governs the current 
Connectome project. It will be 10 or 100 times more costly than the Genome Project, 
but not more adequate in reporting on the infinite variability of the cortex. Windelband’s 
view of nomothetic science – expressed in universally valid laws (such as Newton’s laws 
of mechanics) – and idiographic science – diachronic processes never the same – could as 
well guide in defining new methods for gaining knowledge peculiar to the living. Gelfand’s 
take on the matter of capturing the peculiar dynamics of life processes point in the same 
direction: “There is only one thing which is more unreasonable than the unreasonable 
effectiveness of mathematics in physics, and this is the unreasonable ineffectiveness of 
mathematics in biology”.
Looking forward
I recently watched a video interview with Rosen. (He was talking to Peter Cariani, a young 
man at that time, who preferred Pattee – a friend of Rosen’s – and the deterministic path.) 
The body suffers, the eyes remained of extreme expression, the mind is alert, but not free 
of concerns. It was tough for him to realize his own decline of anticipatory performance. 
We know of his attempt to make anticipation useful: an invention, consulting work, and, 
to the extent possible, more writing (his handwriting gives away the fast deterioration of 
motoric skills). The testimony of integrity contains the expression of worry regarding the 
misuse of the anticipation thought. Indeed, to deserve attention, anticipation has to deliver, 
but in a responsible manner. Each of the projects carried out with my involvement reflected 
this awareness. The “aging car” idea (a concept delivered in 2003 to Audi, Ingolstadt) and 
shortly after that to the Mercedes Research Group (Palo Alto, CA) are examples easy to 
understand. But also easy to misuse. As we age, our ability to drive a vehicle is affected by 
decreased anticipation. A machine-learning utility could create the profile of the driver 
and make sure that the car compensates for what is affected. How to protect this profile 
of the driver from those who might misuse it is not trivial. But it has to be considered in 
detail. Of course, from here to the “driverless” car (or any other vehicle), the jump is not 
really big. Social consequences, however, are huge. In the AnticipationScope, we were able 
to detect Parkinson’s disease in pre-onset phase. It is not a cure, but early diagnostics can 
ease, through behavioral treatment, the adaptation to all that this cruel disease entails. The 
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diagnostic, as useful as it might be, also creates problems for those who might receive it. A 
responsible anticipation science researcher cannot ignore the danger of “marking” some 
as prey to legitimate or illegitimate interventions. Interaction computation, as an alter-
native to Turing computation, augments anticipatory processes (such as in navigation). 
The association between physiological processes and anticipatory expression is yet another 
landmark – in the Bernstein tradition – to current attempts at ubiquitous monitoring and 
all its consequences. An anticipation-informed understanding of human–computer inter-
action resulted in contributions to interface design. Pokemon Go is finally incorporating 
anticipatory features in the immersive interactive experience. But the moral price of this 
innovation is also high.
Many other projects are in progress; and if not me, then others will eventually report on 
them and will make sure that the potential of understanding anticipation systems does not 
increase the many risks people face. If the years to come will allow, I would love to finish a 
book on anticipation examined from the complexity threshold of decidability, extended to 
that of evaluating consequences. Also, one on A New Foundation for Semiotics, based on the 
evidence that anticipation is its underlying justification. We need semiotics because to deal 
with the possible future is to deal with representations and their meaning. Last but not least, 
continuing to make the point that change is the ultimate raison d’être of all science, a book 
project on the subject, probably shorter than the report you are reading here, is in the works. 
The more we know about a subject, the less it takes to share this knowledge with others.
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